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AGENCY
MERTON FERSON*

MASTER AN SERVANT
The facts in Dickson v. Blacker1 were these: Dickson operated a
filling station in Memphis and, along with it, a parking lot situated one
and one-half blocks from the filling station. Blacker left his automobile at the filling station for storage, and it was taken to the parking
lot. An employee of Dickson was sent to the parking lot to get the car.
The employee, without permission, drove the car away and wrecked
it six blocks from the filling station. Blacker, the owner of the car,
was allowed to recover from Dickson, the owner of the filling station
parking lot.
A good many cases similar to this one have come before the courts.
They are cases where servants of bailees have wrongfully taken out
the thing bailed and then either injured the thing or made off with it.
It may seem at first blush that when such a servant takes out a customer's car "he is on a frolic of his own" and is not acting as a servant of
the bailee. It must be remembered, however, that it is the duty of the
bailee to protect the car or other chattel that has been entrusted to
him. The bailee has employed the servant to perform that duty. Therefore, the servant's omission to protect the car is in the scope of his
employment. The bailee-master should be liable whether his servant
drives the car away or permits some third person to do it.
A dramatic illustration of the idea that a master can be charged for
an omission, as well as for an act, on the part of his servant is found
in Craker v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. 2 In that case, it appeared
that an amorous conductor employed by the defendant had kissed the
plaintiff, a protesting lady passenger. The company was held liable for
the indignity that befell the plaintiff. Was the conductor remiss within
the scope of his employment? His behavior must be viewed in two
aspects. First, his act- i.e., kissing the plaintiff- was clearly outside
the scope of his employment. But, second, his omission to protect the
plaintiff was just as clearly within the scope of his employment. Said
the court: "The carrier's contract is to protect the passenger against
all the world; the appellant's construction is, that it was to protect the
respondent against all the world except the conductor, whom it appointed to protect her: reserving to the shepherd's dog a right to
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Dean Emeritus, University of
Cincinnati College of Law. Mr. Ferson's book on Agency will be published
at an early date.
1. 253 S.W.2d 728 (Tenn. 1952). See the comment on this case in the Bailments section of the Personal Property and Sales article.
2. 36 Wis. 657 (1875).
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worry the sheep. No subtleties in the books could lead us to sanction
3
so vicious an absurdity."
The decision reached by the Court in Dickson v. Blacker is in accord
with the majority of the decisions in such cases. 4 The theory on which
the Court reached its decision is not altogether clear. At one point in
the opinion, it is said "the garage keeper merely becomes liable for the
acts of his servant regardless of whether these acts were committed
within or without the scope of the servant's employment. The damage
to the car was due to the tort of the servant of the garagekeeper."S
But, as to acts outside the scope of his employment, he would not be a
servant of the garagekeeper. It would seem, however, that when the
servant permitted himself to drive the car away, he was remiss in the
scope of his employment, just as he would be if he permitted a third
person to drive it away. And that omission should be charged to the
master-bailee.
In Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. Hamilton Nat. Bank,6 the
facts were these: Stone & Webster had considerable business with the
Hamilton National Bank. An employee of Stone & Webster, by
the name of Bales, was permitted by the Bank to have access to its
banking house. "Bales stole $5000 in cash from the Hamilton National
by purloining from a table behind a teller's window packages of money
aggregating that amount and carrying the currency away without permission.... Bales stole the money to repay a shortage in his accounts
with his employer, Stone &Webster." 7 Bales turned the money over to
Stone & Webster and took a receipt from the cashier of that corporation. The Bank sued to recover the money stolen by Bales and by him
turned over to his employers, Stone & Webster. By a two-to-one
decision, it was held that the Bank should recover.
Let us consider first whether Stone & Webster was liable for the act
of Bales in converting the plaintiff's money. There is no showing that
the taking of this money fell within the scope of Bales' employment.
The mere fact that Bales' work took him to the vicinity where he did
wrong is not enough to establish that his wrongful act was within his
employment. 8 And this is not one of the exceptional cases where an
alleged master is held because he has created an appearance that the
wrongdoer acted for him. It is not, for example, like the case of
3. 36 Wis. at 673.
4. Miller v. Viola State Bank, 121 Kan. 193, 246 Pac. 517 (1926); Eaton v.
Lancaster, 79 Me. 477, 10 Atl. 449 (1887); Citizens Bank of Coldwater v. Callicott, 178 Miss. 747, 174 So. 78 (1937); Todd v. Natchez-Eola Hotels Co., 171
Miss. 577, 157 So. 703 (1934); Linam v. Murphy, 360 Mo. 1140, 232 S.W.2d 937
(1950); Aitchison v. Page Motors, Ltd., 52 T.L.R. 137 (K.B. 1935). Contra:
Castorina v. Rosen, 290 N.Y. 445, 49 N.E.2d 521 (1943).
5. 253 S.W.2d at 730.
6. 199 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1952) (case appealed from E.D. Tenn.).
7. 199 F.2d at 131.
8. Greathouse v. Texas Public Utilities Corp., 217 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948); Linden v. City Car Co., 239 Wis. 236, 300 N.W. 925 (1941).
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Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 9 where an employee of a railroad
company falsely and fraudulently represented to the plaintiff that a
shipment had arrived for him. Nor is it like the case of Rutherford
v. Rideout Bank, 0 where a bank manager made false and fraudulent
statements to a customer of the bank. In these cases, the fraudulent
persons had been employed to do the kind of acts they did. Such
employers are held liable. The latter is the type of case that is contemplated by section 261 of the Restatement of Agency - a section that
is relied on by the Court in the principal case. However, it would seem
that the taking of the money by Bales did not fall within his real or
apparent employment.
Now we come to the transaction wherein Bales paid the stolen money
to Stone & Webster. The background of that transaction is this: Owing
to Bales defalcation, Stone & Webster had a claim against him that it
did not know it had. That claim could come to an end in either one of
two ways -that is, it could be surrendered by the creditor, Stone &
Webster, or it could be paid and satisfied by the debtor, Bales. In this
case Bales, the debtor, paid it.
Bales clearly intended to pass the title to this money to Stone &
Webster. As the dissenting judge points out," United States currency
is negotiable in the sense that it can be passed by delivery, and when
such currency comes into the hands of a holder in due course his title
is good against the claims of former owners. Was Stone & Webster a
holder in due course? More specifically, (1) did it have notice that
Bales had stolen the money, and (2) did it take for value?
First, it is conceded that Stone & Webster had no actual knowledge
that the money Bales paid in had been stolen. It should not be charged
with what Bales knew. He was its servant in the doing of some things,
but he was an adverse party in the paying of money to square his account. A principal is not charged with the knowledge of his agent
12
when the agent is dealing as an adverse party.
Second, in considering whether Stone & Webster was a taker for
value, it should be noted that the question is not whether it gave
"consideration," as that term is used in the law of contracts. One can
take for value without giving consideration. For historical reasons,13
it came to be a doctrine in the common law that a contract obligation
cannot be created unless there is consideration for the promise. In
order to make out consideration, it is not enough to find that the
promisee suffered detriment. It must also appear that the detriment
was "bargained for and given in exchange for the promise."' 14 The very
9. 278 U.S. 349, 49 Sup. Ct. 161, 73 L. Ed. 415 (1929).

10. 11 Cal.2d 479, 80 P.2d 978, 117 A.L.R. 383 (1938).
11. 199 F.2d at 133.
12. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 279 (1933).
13. See FERSON, BASIS OF CONTRACTS 125-32 (1949).
14. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).
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transaction is not made if consideration, as thus defined, is lacking.
On the other hand, when a transfer of property is attempted, the
transaction can be perfectly valid whether the transfer is by way of
gift, sale or exchange. The giving of consideration is not essential to
the vesting of title in the transferee. 15
But should a donee of property retain his title free from the claims
of other persons against his donor with regard to the very property
transferred? The question arises when an unfaithful trustee has transferred his title. It arises also when a donor transfers the title to a
negotiable instrument or a chattel which he has fraudulently acquired.
A donee of trust property holds it subject to the trust, 6 and a donee
of a negotiable instrument or a chattel which his donor procured by
fraud must give it up to its former owner17 The rights of former
owners in such cases rest on an idea-

equitable by nature-

that it

is unconscionable for a donee to retain the property. The point being
emphasized is that the rights of former owners, who have been
wronged, to get their property back are not a part of the doctrine of
consideration. It is no part of the taking-for-value requirement that
surrender of an antecedent debt, or other value, shall have been "bargained for and given in exchange for" the property acquired.
It has come to be almost uniformly held that one who receives a
transfer of a negotiable instrument or a chattel in payment of an antecedent debt is a holder for value.18 Bales owed Stone & Webster a duty
to reimburse it for his defalcation. Stone & Webster was not aware that
it had this right. It was wiped out when Bales paid what he owed.
Does the fact that Stone & Webster was not aware that it had such a
right until after it was gone prevent it from being a taker of the money
for value? The majority opinion recites that Stone & Webster "gave
nothing for the money.., surrendered no evidence of debt.... parted
9 This is enough to negate a barwith no valuable consideration ....'1
gained exchange between Bales and his employer. If the right of Stone
the money depended on its making out that it gave
& Webster to retain
"consideration" 20 for the money, it should fail. But, although it gave
no "consideration," it did take title to the money for value, and it is
conscionable for it to retain that money. Analogous cases have come
up from time to time. In the case of Baldwin v. Childs,21 for instance,
it appeared that Childs & Joseph sold fraudulent bills of lading to
certain banks. The goods these bills of lading purported to represent
15. Waite v. Gruble, 43 Ore. 406, 73 Pac. 206 (1903).
16. 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 289 (1939); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 289 (1935).
17. 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 650

§ 168 (1937).

(Rev. ed. 1948);

RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION

18. BRAN AN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 391 et seq.

3 WILLISTON, SALES § 620 (Rev. ed. 1948).
19. 199 F.2d at 131.
20. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

§ 75 (1932).

21. 249 N.Y. 212, 163 N.E. 737 (1928).

(6th ed., Beutel, 1938);
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were not given to the carrier. They were not even in existence when
the banks bought the bills. Childs & Joseph then procured goods from
the plaintiff by fraud and delivered them to the vessel "to feed the bills
of lading." It was held that the banks were purchasers for value. The
cash payments made by the banks gave them a right to be indemnified
for the fraud that had been perpetrated on them. They did not know
they had such a right. But, when goods were delivered to the carrier
for the banks, they were purchasers for value.
It would seem that the dissenting opinion in the principal case is
better supported by principle and authority than is the majority
opinion.
The case of Earley v. Roadway Express, Inc.,22 held that exemplary
damages cannot be assessed against a master on account of wanton
injuries inflicted by his servant except in these cases: (1) where the
master is under a special duty to the person injured, such as the duty
of carrier to passenger; (2) where the nature of the employment is
such that the use of force must be contemplated, as where guards or
watchmen are entrusted with weapons and told to keep off trespassers;
and (3) where a dangerous instrumentality is entrusted to the servant, as in the case of a railroad locomotive whose whistle is willfully
sounded.
In Boles v. Russell,23 these facts were in evidence: Fox Russell,
twenty-nine years of age and single, desired to buy an automobile.
Since he was of draft age and unmarried, a finance company refused to
finance the purchase. In that situation, Fox's father, H. C. Russell, gave
a note for the price of the car. The title and license were taken in the
father's name. Fox, the son, lived with his father. He worked part
time on his father's farm and part time for Greene County. The
plaintiff was injured by the negligent operation of the car by Fox
Russell, the son. The father, H. C. Russell, was made party defendant
on the theory that he was liable under the family purpose doctrine.
The jury rejected the idea that the family purpose doctrine applied
and returned a verdict in favor of the father, H. C. Russell. This verdict was upheld by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court recognized that the family purpose doctrine is
a part of the law of Tennessee. It held, however, that the mere facts
that a father owned a car and that his son drove it fall short of proving
"family purpose." Said the Court: Liability in such cases "must be
predicated solely on the theory of respondeat superior, i.e., that the car
was being maintained by a member of the family for family use and
that, at the time of the injury, it was being operated by a member of
the family in furtherance of that purpose, thus making the operator
22. 106 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Tenn. 1952).
23. 252 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
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the agent of the person maintaining the car." 24 The view of the Court
seems interesting and sound, as it subsumes the family purpose doctrine under the more comprehensive doctrine of respondeat superior.
PlNci'AL AND AGENT

In Bailey v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 25 an agent of the insurance
company, by the name of Crump, received from the plaintiff's husband
an application for a life insurance policy and a small payment to be applied on the first premium. Crump represented to the insured that the
policy would take effect immediately, if a cash payment were made at
the time the application was executed. The application signed by the
insured provided that such policy as the company might issue would
not take effect until the applicant should pay an amount equal to the
full amount of the first premium on the policy applied for. The receipt
Crump gave to the applicant, for the part payment he made, also recited that no insurance would be in effect under the application unless
the full first premium were paid. Neither the plaintiff nor the applicant read the application or receipt. The applicant was killed soon
after making the application and before the policy was delivered. The
Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court, held that the company was
not liable.
The decision involved and approved several propositions that seems
to be sound. In the first place, the recitals in the application signed by
the applicant were binding on him whether or not he read them.26 In
the second place, the assurance given Crump that the policy would
take effect, even if the first premium had not been paid in full, would
not bind the company unless Crump was authorized to make such assurance. It will be noted that Crump had not merely made a representation; he had presumed to bind the company in a contract. That
calls for authority.27 In the third place, the insured could not establish
an estoppel against the company. He could not claim to have been misled after signing the application, which virtually told him that he had
no insurance until the first premium was paid in full.
In Cherokee Fire Ins. Co. v. Ingraham,28 it appeared that Truett, an
agent of the insurance company, approached the Ingrahams and solicited that they list with him a piece of land for sale. Truett did not
disclose to the Ingrahams that he was an agent of the insurance company. After securing from the Ingrahams a written listing of their
property at $17,500, Truett procured the signature of the insurance
24. 252 S.W.2d at 802.
25. 250 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1951).
26. 1 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 35 (Rev. ed. 1936).

27. Ferson, Bases for Master's Liability and for PrincipalsLiability to Third
Persons,4 VAND. L. REV. 260, 266 (1951).
28. 250 S.W.2d 114 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
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company. This signature was essentially an acceptance of the Ingrahams' offer to sell. The insurance company was denied specific performance of the contract. The decision well illustrates a doctrine in
the law of agency. The agent is a fiduciary. Since it is his duty to act
solely for the benefit of his principal, he cannot act as agent for adverse parties unless the respective principals consent to such double
agency. A contract that has been negotiated by an agent who was
acting for both parties is voidable at the option of a principal who had
no knowledge of the double agency. 29
29. Olson v. Pettibone, 168 MIinn. 414, 210 N.W. 149, 48 A.L.R. 913 (1926).

For a collection of many cases, see Note, 48 A.L.R. 917 (1927).

